While Microsoft’s FTC case has given the world a behind-the-scenes look modern platform holderA vast trove of old Sega docs from the ’90s were also leaked in Sega’s emails at the same time, and they go a long way in explaining… well, why Sega is no longer a platform owner.
The documents collected and uploaded to Sega Retroare a mix of everything from E3 floor plans to financial results. However, some of the highlights are internal emails, like this one from March 1996, in which former Sega of America CEO Tom Kalinsky writes about the battle between the Sega Saturn and Sony’s PlayStation, a battle that didn’t end like it did started:
It’s one thing to hear/read how well we compare to Sony in Japan, quite another to experience it in person. I just visited 10 retail stores in Tokyo (most in Akihabra); It’s spring break now and the crowd of teenagers/students is huge. We’re killing Sony. Every store has Saturn hardware sold out and there are stacks of Playstations. Retailers said they can’t compare actual sales rate because Saturn sells out before they can get an accurate measurement. Our interactive displays are better, our software displays and inventory far better. It’s not uncommon for even small stores to stock 40-50 copies of Panzer Zwei or Virtua Fighter 2, and they sell out quickly. I wish I could get all of our employees, sales people, retailers, analysts, media, etc. to see and understand what is happening in Japan. They would then understand why we will eventually win here in the USA.
How do we show that at E3?
To be fair to Tom, in the early days of 1994-95 Saturn – buoyed by the popularity of Virtual Fighter– actually outsold the PlayStation in Japan! However, this success was short-lived Final Fantasy VII In 1997, the Sony console was put out of sight, making Kalinsky’s We Are Kill Sony series one of the most aging in video game history.
In another document, here is Kalinsky again, looking a bit more desperate in April 1996 when he made the Saturn’s new price of $249 particularly clear:an attempt to undercut Sony’s famous introductory price of $299 for the PlayStation– while also wondering what the heck is up with the “Hare Krishna cult members” in a Saturn TV commercial:
Here’s the commercial in case you’ve never seen it:
Also of interest are a number of marketing strategies for 1997, which provide a glimpse of the type of struggle Sega was facing by this point in the Saturn launch; While some ideas are based around selling the Saturn based on its own strengths, like Sega’s first-party games, there are many things that are just obsessing over Sony’s plans, reacting to Sony’s pricing, trying to pre-empt Sony’s release schedule… it really speaks to a company that can catch up by 1997 in just about every imaginable way.
Moving on for a list of Sega’s “critical software issues” the Saturn faced in FY97, and they’re brutally honest, calling out Psygnosis and talking crazy shit about it (that famous as hell) heart of darkness and I wonder how many of these games will be ready to be shown at E3:
If you want to read the full document dump, you can find it hereand aside from the things I’ve posted above, there’s also a slew of cereal promotional boxes, sales literature, and even internal emails bemoaning how terrible Sega’s sports performance has become.
And if reading through it makes you feel like Sega was a troubled company, remember that many of these documents date back to 1997. Just four years later, in 2001, Sega would exit the console business entirely.
